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Abstract
The National Guard is establishing Cyber Mission Teams (CMT) that will fulfill a federal
role to backfill active duty defending Department of Defense networks, but are also exploring
how they could effectively fulfill state missions. The President, Council of Governors, and
USCYBERCOM Commander have expressed concerns about U.S. critical infrastructure
cyber network vulnerabilities and the increasing magnitude of threat our adversaries pose to
those networks’ security. This article explores using this emerging National Guard capability
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in a state role for protection of critical infrastructure cyber networks. Most of the critical
infrastructure is privately owned. Although current executive orders and policy mandate
government sharing of cyber threat information, private providers’ reciprocation of sharing
their vulnerabilities is voluntary. This article contends that effective cyber defense requires
strong private-public partnerships. We developed a critical infrastructure cyber defense
model based upon key characteristics from the literature on private-public partnerships and
performed a case study of current cyber defense partnerships to validate the model. Our
research shows this model to be a useful guide for emerging National Guard Cyber Mission
Forces to consider when establishing partnerships for effective critical infrastructure cyber
defense.
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Introduction
Approximately 85 percent of America’s critical infrastructure is owned and
operated by private industry.1 According to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), the daily operations of our nation’s critical
infrastructure are controlled by Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Initially,
ICS had little resemblance to traditional information technology systems in
that ICS were isolated systems running proprietary control protocols using
specialized hardware and software. Remote maintenance access to ICS
systems is more prevalent now since low-cost Internet Protocol devices are
widely available. This has made ICS systems more susceptible to outside
threats.2 In 2014, over 52,000 cyber security incidents occurred on some
form of critical infrastructure network.3
Attacks in the past ten years have shown that an attack from cyberspace could
seriously damage or disrupt our energy infrastructure. In January 2014,
Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper, the vice chair of the National
Governors Association, warned his fellow governors that, “the next battlefront
is likely not a field or town, but a computer network that supports our critical
infrastructure.”4 According to Admiral Michael Rogers, the USCYBERCOM
commander, in his March 4, 2015 testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, “The U.S. government, the states and the private sector can’t
defend their information systems on their own against the most powerful
cyber forces.” He also commented that, “We believe potential adversaries
might be leaving cyber fingerprints on our critical infrastructure, partly to
convey a message that our homeland is at risk if tensions ever escalate toward
military conflict.”5 The costs to harden the US energy sector against cyberattacks are projected to be more than $7 billion by 2020 for the electric power
industry and nearly $2 billion by 2018 for the oil and gas industry. Now,

Nathan E. Busch, and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland
Security Opportunities and Challenges,” Homeland Security Affairs 8 (October 2012).
2 Keith Stouffer, Joe Falco, and Karen Scarfone, “Guide to Industrial Control Systems
(ICS) Security,” NIST Special Publication (2011): 800-82.
3 Verizon Corporation, “2015 Data Breach Investigations Report,” Verizon, 2015,
available at: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/
4 William Matthews, ʺCyber Uncertainty,ʺ National Guard: The Official Publication of the
National Guard Association of the United States, July 2014, available at:
http://nationalguardmagazine.com/display_article.php?id=1764536&id_issue=21806
6
5 Cheryl Pellerin, “CYBERCOM Chief: Cyber Threats Blur Roles, Relationships,” Official
Wire, March 6, 2015, available at: http://www.officialwire.com/news/cybercom-chiefcyber-threats-blur-roles-relationships/
1
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more than ever, there is a higher need for more efficient critical infrastructure
cyber defense.6

Federal Role in Homeland Cyber Defense
Executive Order 13636 mandates the Secretary of Homeland Security in
collaboration with the Secretary of Defense will provide classified cyber threat
and technical information to eligible private critical infrastructure
companies.7 While the sharing of that information by private industry is
highly encouraged, it is purely voluntary.
One result of this mandate was the establishment of the National
Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), which serves
as a 24/7 centralized location for the coordination and integration of cyber
situational awareness and incident management. NCCIC partners include all
federal departments and agencies; state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments; the private sector; and international entities. The NCCIC
provides its partners with enhanced situational awareness of cybersecurity
and communications incidents and risks, and provides timely information to
manage vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents. In 2014, the NCCIC received
over 97,000 incident reports, and issued nearly 12,000 actionable cyberalerts or warnings. NCCIC teams also detected over 64,000 vulnerabilities on
federal and non-federal systems and directly responded to 115 significant
cyber incidents.8 The NCCIC also relies heavily on voluntary collaboration
with its partners. The Center provides, free of charge, penetration analysis
and vulnerability assessments on cyber networks for critical infrastructure
providers in a private-public partnership (PPP).

National Guard Role in Homeland Cyber Defense
In 2013, lawmakers in Congress introduced the Cyber Warrior Act that would
create a Guard Cyber and Network Incident Response Team for each state.
The teams would leverage private-sector IT experts in the Guard and could be
called on by governors and the defense secretary to respond to cyber
A. Kambour, Enhancing the Cybersecurity of Energy Systems and Infrastructure
(Washington, D.C.: National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, August 4,
2014).
7 Barrack Obama, “Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity,” February 12, 2013, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity
8 Andy Ozment, NPPD Office of Cybersecurity and Communications Assistant Secretary,
“Emerging Threats and Technologies to Protect the Homeland,” Testimony before the
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection and Security Technologies hearing, February 12, 2015.
6
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incidents. Senator Christopher Coons from Delaware pointed out, “The bill
would allow the Guard to respond to cyber disasters just as it does to natural
disasters.”9 In an address to the National Governors Association, Colorado
Governor John Hickenlooper stated “the National Guard should be mobilized
to support federal and state efforts to protect critical infrastructure networks
and respond to cyber incidents.”10 In the 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act, the National Guard has now been authorized to establish
more cyber mission teams (11 Army and 12 Air Guard), primarily to defend
critical cyber networks against attacks from adversaries.
The National Guard forces can be activated for federal service under Title 10
US code or to perform state service under Title 32 US code. The dual status of
the National Guard forces makes them a distinctive state homeland defense
asset with direct access to Department of Defense (DoD) classified threat
information and a national level multi-agency collaboration network. With
federal funding, the National Guard Cyber Mission Forces are able to
maintain their skills through participation in DoD sponsored exercises such
as Cyber Guard which focuses on cyber defense of critical infrastructure. The
National Guard force is 75 percent part-time military members who work fulltime in the civilian workforce. This means many of the cyber defender
guardsmen likely work in some of the critical infrastructure industries.
The government is unable to use federal military forces to enforce civil laws
under the Posse Comitatus Act. However National Guard forces operating
under the state authority of Title 32 are exempt from Posse Comitatus Act
restrictions. Title 32 Section 902 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
“provide funds to a Governor to employ National Guard units or members to
conduct homeland defense activities that the Secretary determines to be
necessary and appropriate.”11 Even though most of the funding for National
Guard equipment and training comes from federal sources, National Guard
personnel and equipment are not “federalized” and therefore are available to
the Governor in state or local emergencies.12 The statute defines “homeland
defense activities” as activities “undertaken for the military protection of the
territory or domestic population of the United States, or of the infrastructure
or other assets of the United States determined by the Secretary of Defense as
William Matthews, “Cyber Uncertainty.”
Ibid
11 US Code Title 32 Chapter 9 Section 902, “National Guard: Homeland Defense
Activities: Definitions,” available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/32/902
12 Maj. Gen. Timothy J. Lowenberg, “The Role of the National Guard in National Defense
and Homeland Security,” National Guard Association of the United States, no date,
available at: http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/pdf/primer%20fin.pdf .
9
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being critical to national security, from a threat or aggression against the
US.”13
In many states, the Director of Homeland Security is the Lieutenant Governor
who can recall troops to provide critical infrastructure defense through state
funded or federal funded roles. Washington is one state whose government
has established a critical infrastructure cyber defense capability in its
National Guard network warfare units.14 Washington state government
statutes assign the state’s emergency management to the Adjutant General
and military department of the state which oversee cyber incidents
threatening state or national security. They also offer their private and public
utilities providers free penetration analysis and vulnerability assessments
through partnerships to collectively defend those networks controlling critical
infrastructure assets.
Currently Maryland, Michigan and California also have National Guard cyber
mission forces and are developing frameworks to use those forces in a state
role to defend critical infrastructure with private industry. In California, a
joint Computer Network Defense Team performs vulnerability assessments,
risk identification, incident response and other services for state agencies free
of charge. The state also has an Air Guard Network Warfare Squadron that
can be called on by the governor to test the security of state networks.15
In Maryland, the Air National Guard Network Warfare Squadron performs
security assessments on state computer networks. The squadron teams with
state agencies to launch simulated attacks against state networks. When they
succeed, the squadron helps develop countermeasures to block future
attacks.16 These are the type of partnerships that many other state
governments are wanting to develop with trained cyber defenders who can aid
in thwarting the constant evolving threat posed on the most critical and
vulnerable networks; however, federal appropriations have limited the
current number of cyber forces.

US Code Title 32 Chapter 9 Section 901, “National Guard: Homeland Defense
Activities: Definitions,” available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/32/901
14 A. Kambour, “Enhancing the Cybersecurity of Energy Systems and Infrastructure.”
15 William Matthews, “Cyber Uncertainty.”
16 Ibid
13
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Critical Infrastructure Cyber Defense Model Based on PrivatePublic Partnership Concept
For a number of years the US government has been stressing the importance
of government and private industry to work together in partnerships in order
to secure this nation’s critical infrastructure. This need for private-public
cyber defense partnerships is a thread which has carried through the 2002
National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space, and continues through the 2006
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and President Obama's 2009
Cyber Space Policy Review.17 One can therefore deduce that cyber defense in
critical infrastructure protection depends heavily on effective private-public
partnerships (PPPs).
Our literature review and interviews with National Guard and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) cyber defense teams and private critical
infrastructure providers exposed four recurring key features for effective
PPPs: relationships, competency, shared equities and governance. We
combined these aspects into a model that constitutes successful critical
infrastructure cyber defense (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Critical Infrastructure Cyber Defense Model

While trust is not explicitly included in the model, three of the four main
factors in the model relate to trust. However, according to academic
literature, trust takes time to develop in a partnership and is multi-faceted.18
In his testimony before the House subcommittee on cybersecurity, Andy
Ozment of NPPD pointed out that if public-private trust is broken, the open
Larry Clinton, “A Relationship on the Rocks: Industry-Government Partnership for
Cyber Defense,” Journal of Strategic Security 4: 2 (2011): 98, available at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.6.
18 Nathan E.Busch, , and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships.”
17
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information exchange critical to the Cyber Information Sharing and
Collaboration Program, which provides a trusted information sharing
environment for private sector partners to share information and collaborate
on cyber security threats, will not occur.19 We now further explore the role of
each model feature.

Relationships
Relationships between the private and public organizations play a key role in
the partnership, and the length of time those relationships have been
established ties to the trust level between partners. The length of time and
amount of interaction within previously established relationships amongst
partner organizations can also impact the amount of time necessary to
establish trust.20 Having those trusting working relationships in place is
helpful during routine operations, but invaluable during crisis.21
Emerging National Guard cyber mission forces can learn from various cyber
defense partnerships. For example, USCYBERCOM cyber defense teams
work with private defense contractors in the Defense Industry Base critical
infrastructure sector to develop private-public partnerships to defend critical
information networks. The DHS NCCIC US-Cyber Emergency Response
Team (US-CERT) and ICS-CERT partner with private critical infrastructure
industry for cyber defense, as do the four states with National Guard units
who have already partnered with critical infrastructure providers to provide
vulnerability assessments and penetration testing for cyber defense incident
response and cooperative exercises.

Shared Equities
Prior research indicates that when trust is low, transaction costs rise, which
inhibits information exchange.22 Explicit strategies to address these
perceptions of risk are critical to success when information exchange is
required for effective collaboration.23 Sharing threat information,
vulnerability data, or incident reporting are good practices for cyber defense
Andy Ozment, “Emerging Threats and Technologies to Protect the Homeland.”
Sharon S.Dawes, , Anthony M. Cresswell, and Theresa A. Pardo, "From “Need to Know”
to “Need to Share”: Tangled Problems, Information Boundaries, and the Building of
Public Sector Knowledge Networks," Public Administration Review 69:3 (2009): 397.
21 Nathan E.Busch and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships.”
22 Candace Jones, William S Hesterly, and Stephen P Borgatti, “A General Theory of
Network Governance Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms,” Academy of
Management Review 12:4(1997): 911.
23 Sharon S. Dawes, Anthony M. Cresswell, and Theresa A. Pardo, “From ‘need to know’”.
19

20
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of critical infrastructure and partnerships as well.24 However, sometimes
allowing information to be shared anonymously can facilitate a more open
information exchange environment.
The DHS understands how crucial information sharing within a partnership
between federal agencies and private entities is to effective critical
infrastructure cyber defense.25 According to a DHS US-CERT representative,
one of the keys to establishing trust and open information exchange is the
cooperative research and development agreements established with their
cyber defense partners.26 Those collaboratively produced documents ensure
that the private industry critical infrastructure cyber defense partner
understands the information voluntarily shared in the partnership will only
be used to enhance its cyber defense and will not be shared with regulatory
agencies in accordance with the Critical Infrastructure Information Act.27
Many private critical infrastructure providers are currently unaware that
those protections exist which leads to a reluctance to voluntarily share cyber
incident or vulnerability information.28

Competency
An organization’s competency and a partner’s perception of how competent
that organization is also add to the trust equation in a partnership. An
organization’s competency can be measured by others through the skill level
of its employees, the organization’s external reputation, its leadership
practices and the organization’s internal processes.
Competency of an organization in a private-public partnership can also
include its ability to safeguard information. The DHS has established the
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program based on
information protection legislation in the 2002 Critical Information Act. PCII
protections mean that homeland security partners can be confident that
European Network and Information Security Agency, “Cooperative Models for Effective
Public Private Partnership: Good Practice Guide,” available at:
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/public-privatepartnership/national-public-private-partnerships-ppps/good-practice-guide-oncooperatve-models-for-effective-ppps.
25 Andy Ozment, “Emerging Threats and Technologies to Protect the Homeland.”
26 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency
Response Team representative, April 6, 2015.
27 Department of Homeland Security Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
homepage, updated June 18, 2014, available at: http://www.dhs.gov/protected-criticalinfrastructure-information-pcii-program.
28 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency
Response Team representative, April 6, 2015.
24
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sharing their information with the government will not expose sensitive or
proprietary data.29 Even though government cyber defense organizations are
bound to protect collected information and not share it with regulatory
agencies, many private organizations in partnerships still do not have a
feeling of sustained trust.30 This feeling of distrust could also result from
private critical infrastructure companies’ lack of understanding of what
protections the Critical Information Act of 2002 and the PCII program afford
with regard to the information they volunteer and what cyber defenders
find.31
Competency can be developed and maintained through regular collaborative
training exercises so that both sides of the partnership can better understand
each other’s capabilities. The Washington state emergency management
division regularly runs collaborative cybersecurity and defense tabletop
exercises with state government leadership, state emergency management,
National Guard cyber mission forces, and private critical infrastructure
providers in order to comprehend the severity of cyber threats, and practice
methods to mitigate those threats.
Cyber Guard is a joint cyberspace training exercise focused on national
defensive cyberspace operations whole-of-government approach with a state
response and a larger federal response to significant cyberattacks on critical
infrastructure. This annual exercise brings together National Guard,
CYBERCOM, DHS, FBI and state Joint Operations Centers in order to better
understand each other’s capabilities and processes.32 Participation in these
training exercises by private and public organizations could also help develop
trust and encourage private-public partnership participation for cyber defense
through better understanding of each organization’s competency. Securing
ICS protocols on industry networks requires specialized training and
certifications separate from defending an industry’s information networks.
Cyber Guard focuses on developing knowledge and joint processes to be
competent to defend those types of systems.

Department of Homeland Security, “Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
Program Fact Sheet,” July 2014, available at:
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PCII-Fact-Sheet-2014-508.pdf.
30 Department of Homeland Security Integrated Task Force, “Evaluation of Existing
Public-Private Partnership Model,” July 12, 2013, available at:
https://www.chicagofirst.org/resources/dhs_partnership_report.pdf.
31 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency
Response Team representative, Apr 6, 2015.
32 US Cyber Command, “Cyber Guard 13-1 After Action Report,” Feb 7, 2014.
29
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In 2012, the Michigan state government partnered with academia and
industry to create a public-private cyber range because they felt that would
help improve cyber defense competency between their National Guard cyber
mission teams and the private sector. Michigan Chief Information Officer
hopes the cyber exercise range will strengthen the state of Michigan’s cyberreadiness and foster stronger private-public partnerships for cyber defense of
critical infrastructure.33

Governance
Governance in critical infrastructure cyber defense currently mandates that
government agencies share information on cyber threat data, guidelines, and
best practices; however, information sharing by private critical infrastructure
providers is voluntary. Regulations do exist, requiring critical infrastructure
networks to be in compliance with reliability standards set by regulatory
organizations. The subject then becomes how understandable and
enforceable the regulations and mandatory standards are. If one government
agency is charged to enforce those mandatory standards, what keeps a nonregulatory government agency such as a National Guard cyber mission team
from turning in a non-compliant private partner for that non-compliance?
This returns to the issue of partners understanding each other’s processes,
particularly with regard to handling and protecting sensitive information and
only providing that information to those with a legitimate need to know.
Due to the increasing threat of cyber incidents to cause significant damage to
critical infrastructure, some states have passed legislation to better defend
critical infrastructure from cyberattack and drafted cyber annexes to their
state emergency action plans. The state of Washington’s cyber annex to their
state emergency action plan designates the state Homeland Security Advisor
as the lead for any significant cyber incident. That state Homeland Security
Advisor coordinates the cyber incident response with the help of state Cyber
Unified Coordination Group consisting of various state government cyber
security officials, law enforcement, cyber academia, the lead National Guard
cyber planner, and private industry critical infrastructure key resources
representatives.34
Colin Wood, “Cybersecurity Gets a Boost from the National Guard,” Emergency
Management, March 3, 2014, available at:
http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Cybersecurity-National-Guard.html?page=1.
34 State of Washington, “Washington State Significant Cyber Incident Annex to the
Washington State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan: Annex D,” March 4,
2015: 7-8, available at:
http://mil.wa.gov/uploads/pdf/PLANS/wastatesignificantcyberincidentannex2015032
4.pdf.
33
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Research Method
Yin’s methods35 were followed to perform a single case study of critical
infrastructure cyber defense to validate the key aspects of effective PPPs
highlighted in the literature review and initial interviews. Another goal of the
case study was to discover how emerging National Guard CMTs could build
effective PPPs by focusing on the main aspects of the critical infrastructure
cyber defense model. Our units of analysis were four current and future cyber
defenders from National Guard and DHS and five public/private critical
infrastructure providers. We used the four main factors of relationships,
competency, shared equities and governance, from our model as our
propositions to study (see Attachment 1) and developed a questionnaire (see
Attachment 2) as a mechanism to link data to the propositions and interpret
findings. All respondents answered the same set of questions. Some of the
respondents have performed critical infrastructure cyber defense in response
to actual cyber incidents and others have performed cyber defense as a
partner organization during Cyber Guard training exercises.

Discussion
Through interviews and questionnaire responses, the overarching theme that
resounded throughout Subject Matter Expert (SME) responses was that PPPs
are very important for an effective critical infrastructure cyber defense. An
effective PPP cannot exist unless mutual trust is established between the
partner organizations and relationships are key to establishing that trust.
Both federal government and private industry officials stated that those
relationships and the necessary trust building takes time and is typically only
effective with personal contacts between the organizations.36 Most
respondents felt having a liaison in their partner organizations would improve
the effectiveness of the critical infrastructure cyber defense partnership. Only
one public critical infrastructure provider felt liaisons would not improve
cyber defense partnerships and that was the only respondent who stated
he/she currently utilizes liaisons. This response clearly emphasizes the need
to better understand and develop the role of an effective liaison in PPPs.
Most of the respondents from both private and public felt that transparent
information exchange is an important factor for cyber defense partnerships.
Robert K. Yin, “Case Study Research: Design and Methods,”Sage Publications, 2013:
28-29.
36 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team representative, April 6, 2015.
35
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Currently private critical infrastructure providers are eager to receive
government provided cyber threat information; however, many, especially
those large enough to provide internal cyber defense for their networks, are
reluctant to openly reciprocate that information exchange. Most private
critical infrastructure providers are worried the government agency providing
the cyber defense support will turn their voluntarily shared network
vulnerability data over to a regulatory government agency.37 National Guard
critical infrastructure cyber defenders need to give special attention to those
information protection concerns. These concerns warrant taking the time to
communicate with critical infrastructure providers how data observed during
vulnerability analysis and other cyber defense activities is protected by the
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Act. Dealing with that concern
in this manner should help build more trust since all respondents to the
questionnaire felt knowledge of their partner organization’s information
protection procedures would promote information exchange rather than
impede it. Implementing a practice similar to the DHS written cooperative
trust agreements could address that concern and strengthen partnership
trust.
Both sides agreed security classification of cyber threat data was a common
impediment to information exchange. One critical infrastructure provider
pointed out it is difficult to convince management to implement different,
sometimes costly, security practices when one is not able to share the threat
information with them. It would also be helpful to know which cyber threat
information can be shared with other government organizations within the
partnership because that is not always clear.38 One way DHS has dealt with
that issue is by using state protective security advisors to work with and
sponsor private infrastructure providers for security clearances.39 The
National Guard should use close community ties to provide that same service
to help bridge the gap between government providers of cyber threat data and
private critical infrastructure providers.
All respondents except for one National Guard cyber defender felt it was
important that legislation, standards and policies are easy to interpret.
However, four out of the five critical infrastructure providers and one out of
three National Guard cyber defenders felt current standards are easy to

Interview with anonymous critical infrastructure provider representative, April 9, 2015.
Interview with local Omaha critical infrastructure provider cybersecurity
representative, April 22, 2015.
39 Interview with Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team representative, April 6, 2015.
37

38
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implement. National Guard cyber teams should be prepared to act as
interpreters of standards and policies.
Another way the National Guard cyber teams can bridge the gap between
government agencies and the public-private critical infrastructure providers is
acting as a fusion cell to interpret the many government cyber threat feeds
and filter out the most serious threats to critical infrastructure providers. As
a fusion cell for cyber threat analysis, the National Guard cyber teams could
also provide forensics of the thousands of malware attacks critical
infrastructure providers face and interpret which attacks are malicious and
severe enough to recommend spending resources to defend against them.40
Interestingly, most of the respondents felt their own personnel did not have
the necessary expertise and training for critical infrastructure cyber defense.
National Guard cyber teams should be aware that a majority of the partners
see joint cyber defense training exercises, such as Cyber Guard, as important
for improving cyber defense partnership capabilities. Most respondents are
interested in third parties such as local universities providing mock
ICS/SCADA networks or Michigan’s state-wide cyber range as mediums for
that collaborative joint training. National Guard cyber teams should
investigate these third party training opportunities to help forge effective
cyber PPPs.
Some threats to the validity of our findings were the short amount of time
allowed for this study, only three months, and the small sampling of SMEs
available to answer the questionnaire. Future studies should attempt to
question more subjects from a variety of critical infrastructure providers.

Conclusions
More remote access to industry information technology systems has made the
ICS protocols which regulate daily operations on the nation’s critical
infrastructure cyber networks more vulnerable to outside attack. Federal and
state governments have always had the authority to use National Guard forces
to physically defend critical infrastructure and key resources vital to the
nation’s interests and way of life. Many state governments feel cyber defense
of the networks controlling that critical infrastructure is not much different,
which makes cyber defense of critical infrastructure a lucrative role for the
National Guard cyber mission forces that state governments are working to
Interview with local Omaha critical infrastructure provider cybersecurity
representative, April 22, 2015.
40
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develop. Due to the privatization of most of the nation’s critical
infrastructure, the National Guard CMTs will have to develop effective
private-public partnerships with those private industries in order to be
successful in this new mission set vital to our nation’s security. Based upon
this case study, the critical infrastructure cyber defense model provides a
good guide for National Guard cyber mission teams to reference when
developing private-public partnerships to perform their mission effectively.
National Guard CMTs should build upon their current community
relationships to establish written agreements with critical infrastructure
partners to develop the underlying trust that encourages information sharing.
They should also use those same community relationships with academia and
industry to create third party training networks for all partners to promote a
collaborative learning environment for a more effective critical infrastructure
cyber defense and stronger trusting partnerships.
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Appendix 1. Case Study Propositions

Proposition
Categories
1.
Relationships

Propositions
Having an established relationship between private and public
partners, no matter the type, builds trust which leads to a more
effective mission than only assembly the partnership in crisis
1.a. Whether partner relationships are formal or informal does not
matter, but rather is the existence of a relationship affects trust.
1.b. Long term relationships with frequent partner interaction
establish a more effective partnership than reactionary short term
crisis relationships.
1.c. Previous existence of a relationship between partner organizations
leads to more trust established.
2. Shared
The partners in the cyber defense private-public partnership must
Equities
share some equities to establish and maintain trust.
2.a. There is a sense of shared goals and benefits. Partners depend
upon each other to accomplish these common goals.
2.b. Risk should be evenly shared amongst the partners in order to
establish trust.
2.c. Free exchange of information is critical to an effective cyber
defense partnership. Trust between partners is critical for this
information sharing to occur.
2.d. Evenly distributed and understood responsibilities and
accountability amongst the cyber defense partnership are important to
establish trust.
3. Competency The ability for partners to perform their responsibilities competently.
3.a. Knowledge of partner's cyber defense capabilities is critical to
developing trust in the partnership.
3.b. Both sides of the private-public partnership are lacking proper
training to effectively perform cyber defense mission and require
knowledge from their partner organization.
3.c. Knowledge of partner's cyber defense and information protection
processes are important to establish and maintain partnership trust.
4. Governance Compliance standards and regulations for critical infrastructure
providers are necessary for effective cyber defense.
4.a. Legislation and standards must be easily understood in order to
effectively be implemented.
4.b. Mismatched information sharing (required for government
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agencies and voluntary for private/public critical infrastructure
companies) hampers the partnership.
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Appendix 2. Questionnaire Relationship to Propositions

Questions
Q1: Are you aware of any
private-public (govt)
partnerships in your
organization for
cybersecurity?
Q1.1 Please select the
nature of those privatepublic partnerships for
cyber defense (you may
choose multiple
answers). Formal,
informal, long-term,
short-term
Q1.2: Are these
partnerships
documented in a memo
of agreement or joint
policies?
Q1.3 How many cyber
defense partnerships
does your organization
currently participate in?
Q1.4 How important
are private-public
partnerships for effective
critical infrastructure
cyber defense?
Q2: Do you think having
a liaison in a partner’s
organization would
improve a cyber-defense
partnership?
Q2.1: Does your
organization currently
have a liaison position
for coordinating cyber
defense activities?

Propositions correlated to Questionnaire Questions
1 1a 1b 1c 2 2a 2b 2c 2d 3 3a 3b 3c 4

X X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Q3 How much does the
cyber defense
competency of the
partner organization
matter for your
responsibilities to
protect key critical
infrastructure elements? X
Q3.1 How important
is it to know about the
cyber defense
capabilities a partner
organization can
provide?
X
Q3.2 Provide some
examples of desirable
capabilities?
Q3.3 How important is
it that your cyber defense
partner organization
participates in ongoing
cyber defense training to
maintain current
knowledge and skills?
Q3.3.1 Do you feel
your own personnel have
the necessary expertise
and training to defend
critical infrastructure
networks?
Q3.4 How important
are joint training
exercises/practice for
cyber defense or incident
response be for
improving mutual
awareness of
capabilities?
Q3.5 How desirable
would it be to have a
third party (e.g.

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

X
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University) provide a
mock Industrial Control
Systems network for
cyber defense education
and training?
Q4 How important do
you think it is to share
transparently, with
attribution, all pertinent
information
(vulnerabilities,
incidents, threat
information) with other
partners for an effective
cyber defense
partnership?
Q5 Would you be more
willing to share
information cyber
defense information
(threat, vulnerabilities,
attack trends, etc.), if
shared anonymously?
Q6 Rate the following
issues for their ability to
hamper information
sharing: 1. Security
Classification of cyber
threat information,
2.Disclosure of
previously known
vulnerabilities, 3. Private
industry competitive
edge, 4. Collaboratively
developed information
sharing agreements
between public and
private partners, 5.
Ability to anonymously
share information, 6.
Knowledge of partner's

X

X

X

X

X

X
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cyber defense
capabilities, 7.
Knowledge of cyber
defense partner's
information protection
practices, 8. Attribution
tied to information
source, 9. NIST
standards for critical
infrastructure cyber
defense
Q6.1 Are there any
other factors that
influence information
sharing in a cyberdefense partnership?
Q7 How important is it
to understand the
methods for protecting
sensitive information
used by your partner
organization in a cyberdefense partnership ?
Q7.1 Your
organization has
established procedures
for protecting sensitive
information pertaining
to critical infrastructure
cyber defense?
(Disagree/Agree)
Q7.1.1 Other
organizations in your
cyber defense
partnership are familiar
with your sensitive
information protection
policies and methods.
(Disagree/Agree)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Q7.2 I trust the
organizations in a cyberdefense partnership for
their ability to provide
the same level of
protection for sensitive
information.
(Disagree/Agree)
Q8 Voluntary
requirements for private
companies to share cyber
defense information are
sufficient for effective
cyber defense of critical
infrastructure.
(Disagree/Agree)
Q8.1 There should be
more legislation for
private companies
mandating sharing of
cyber defense
information with
relevant partners?
(Disagree/Agree)
Q9: How important are
the following aspects to
establishing/maintaining
an effective critical
infrastructure cyber
defense partnership? 1.
Share Risk, 2. Incentives,
3. All cyber defense
partners share common
cyber defense goals, 4.
All cyber defense
partners understand
their own organization's
cyber defense roles and
responsibilities, 5. All
cyber defense partners
understand each other's

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
20

http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss4/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.8.4.1441

Claus et al.: Newest National Defense

cyber defense roles and
responsibilities, 6. All
cyber defense partners
are held equally
accountable to their
responsibilities in the
partnership
Q9.1 Should this risk
be evenly distributed
across the partner
organizations?
Q9.2 What are some
incentives that will likely
improve participation in
cyber defense private
public partnerships?
Q10. How important are
outsourced cyber
security activities are
effective for critical
infrastructure cyber
defense
Q10.1 State sponsored
Cyber Protection Teams
are equally effective for
critical infrastructure
cyber defense.
(Disagree/Agree)
Q10.1.1 What are
some reasons for your
response?
Q11. How important to
critical infrastructure
cyber defense are easily
interpreted legislation
and policies? .
Q11.1 I believe current
regulatory penalties for
non-compliance with
critical infrastructure
cyber network standards

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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are sufficient for critical
infrastructure providers.
(Disagree/Agree)
Q11.2 National
Institute of Standards
and Technology
standards for critical
infrastructure cyber
defense are easy to
implement.
(Disagree/Agree)

X
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